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The eavesdropping scheme proposed by Wo´jcik [Phys. Rev. Lett. 90,157901(2003)] on
the quantum communication protocol of Bostro¨m and Felbinger [Phys. Rev. Lett. 89,
187902(2002)] is improved by constituting a new set of attack operations. The improved
scheme only induces half of the eavesdropping losses in Wo´jcik’s scheme, therefore, in a
larger domain of the quantum channel transmission efficiency η, i.e., [0,75%], the eavesdrop-
per Eve can attack all the transmitted bits. Comparing to Wo´jcik’s scheme, in the improved
scheme the eavesdropping (legitimate) information gain does not vary in the η domain of
[0, 50%], while in the η domain of (50%, 75%] the less eavesdropping losses induce more
eavesdropping information gains, for Eve can attack all the transmitted bits and accordingly
eavesdropping information gains do not decrease. Moreover, for the Bostro¨m-Felbinger
protocol, the insecurity upper bound of η presented by Wo´jcik is pushed up in the this
paper, that is, according to Wo´jcik’s eavesdropping scheme, the Bostro¨m-Felbinger protocol
is not secure for transmission efficiencies lower than almost 60%, while according to the
improved scheme, it is not secure for transmission efficiencies lower than almost 80%.
PACS number(s): 03.67.Hk, 03.65.Ud
Quantum key distribution (QKD) is an ingenious application of quantum mechanics, in which
two remote legitimate users (Alice and Bob) establish a shared secret key through the transmis-
sion of quantum signals. Much attention has been focused on QKD after the pioneering work of
Bennett and Brassard published in 1984 [1]. Till now there have been many theoretical QKDs
[2-20]. Different from the QKDs, the deterministic secure direct communication protocol is to
transmit directly the secret messages without first generating QKD to encrypt them. Hence it
is very useful and usually desired, especially in some urgent time. However, the deterministic
secure direct communication is more demanding on the security than QKDs. Therefore, only
recently a few of deterministic secure direct protocols have been proposed [21-24]. One of them
is the famous Bostro¨m-Felbinger protocol [22], which allows the generation of a deterministic key
or even direct secret communication. In Ref [22] the protocol has been claimed to be secure and
experimentally feasible. However, since the security of the Bostro¨m-Felbinger protocol can be
impaired as far as considerable quantum losses are taken into account, very recently Wo´jcik has
presented an undetectable eavesdropping scheme on the Bostro¨m-Felbinger protocol[25]. Wo´jcik’s
eavesdropping scheme induces the eavesdropping losses at the level of 50% and the anticorrela-
tion of the state of the home photon (kept by Bob, the legitimate receiver of secret messages)
2with that of the travel photon (sent by Bob to Alice, the sender of secret messages). If the
transmission efficiency η of the quantum channel is not taken into account, the probability of
the eavesdropper (i.e., Eve) being detected is zero due to the anticorrelation. However, in the
case of the considerable quantum channel losses, it is possible for legitimate users to detect the
eavesdropping by observing the quantum channel losses. That is, although Eve can attack all the
transmitted bits and the eavesdropping losses can be hidden in the channel losses when η ≤ 50%,
if she attacks all the transmitted bits when η > 50%, then the eavesdropping losses is greater
than the channel losses and accordingly the legitimate users can find Eve in the line by observing
the channel losses. In fact, when η > 50%, it is still possible for Eve to avoid the legitimate users’
detection, for she can eavesdrop only the fraction µ = 2(1− η) of the transmitted bits to induce
less eavesdropping losses, which can be completely hidden in the quantum channel losses. Hence,
in [25] it is concluded that the Bostro¨m-Felbinger protocol is not secure for transmission efficien-
cies lower than almost 60%, i.e., the insecurity upper bound of η is 60%. Nonetheless, in the case
of η > 50%, the eavesdropping (legitimate) information gain will surely decrease (increase) due
to eavesdropping only a fraction of the whole transmitted bits. Then it is intriguing to ask, in
a low-loss quantum channel (i.e., a high transmission efficiency channel), whether Eve can have
more information gain in a way of reducing the eavesdropping losses such that she is able to
eavesdrop all the transmitted bits in a larger domain of η. If so, then the insecurity upper bound
of η presented by Wo´jcik can be pushed up. To address the question, in this brief report, we im-
prove the the Wo´jcik’s eavesdropping scheme [25] by constituting a new set of attack operations.
Our improved eavesdropping scheme indeed induces less eavesdropping losses than that in [25],
therefore, in a larger domain of η, Eve can attack all the transmitted bits. Since when η = 1 the
eavesdropping (legitimate) information gain does not decrease (increase) with the decrease of the
eavesdropping losses, the larger domain in which Eve can attack all the transmitted bits means
that less eavesdropping losses may induce more eavesdropping information gain. Hence, for the
Bostro¨m-Felbinger protocol, the insecurity upper bound of the transmission efficiency presented
by Wo´jcik can be pushed up. One will see these later.
Let us start with the brief description of the Bostro¨m-Felbinger protocol [22]. Bob prepares two
photons in the entangled state |Ψ+〉 = (|0〉|1〉+ |1〉|0〉)/√2 of the polarization degrees of freedom.
He stores one photon (home photon) in his lab and sends Alice the other one (travel photon)
via a quantum channel. After receiving the travel photon Alice randomly switches between the
control mode and the message mode. In the control mode Alice measures the polarization of the
travel photon first and then announces publicly the measurement result and the measurement
basis she used. After knowing Alice’s announcement Bob also switches to the control mode
to measure the home photon in the same basis as that Alice used. Then he compares both
measurement results. They should be perfectly anticorrelated in the absence of Eve. Therefore,
the appearance of identical results is considered to be the evidence of eavesdropping, and if it
occurs the transmission is aborted. In the other case, the transmission continues. In the message
mode, Alice performs the Zjt (j ∈ {0, 1}) operation on the travel photon to encode j and sends it
back to Bob, where Z = |0〉〈0| − |1〉〈1|. After receiving the travel photon Bob measures the state
of both photons in the Bell basis to decode the j = 0(1) corresponding to the |Ψ+〉(|Ψ−〉) result.
3Now along the line of Wo´jcik’s eavesdropping scheme [25], we present detailedly the improved
scheme, which never produces the identical results of the measurements performed by Bob and
Alice in the control mode also but induces less eavesdropping losses than that in [25]. Let us
first consider an ideal quantum channel (i.e., η = 1). Obviously, Eve has no access to the home
photon but can manipulate the travel photon while it goes from Bob to Alice and back from
Alice to Bob. Eve uses two auxiliary spatial modes x, y. She prepares a photon in the state |0〉
and lets the other one be an empty mode, e.g., in the state |vac〉x|0〉y. Accordingly, the state of
the whole system including the entangled photon pair is
|initial〉 = |Ψ+〉ht|vac〉x|0〉y. (1)
When Bob sends the travel photon to Alice, Eve attacks the quantum channel by manipulating
the travel photon through an unitary operation (referred as to be the B−A attack hereafter) as
follow,
T = NxyCytxNtyCtxyHy, (2)
where N represents the CNOT gate [25], H is the Hadamard gate, and C stands for the so-called
three-mode CPBS gate [25], which is constructed by CNOT gates and a polarizing beam splitter
transmitting (reflecting) photons in the state |0〉(|1〉). When acting on the initial state, the B−A
attack transforms the whole system to the state |B −A〉 = T |initial〉 of the form
|B −A〉 = 1
2
|0〉h(|vac〉t|1〉x|0〉y + |1〉t|1〉x|vac〉y)
+
1
2
|1〉h(||0〉tvac〉x|1〉y + |0〉t|0〉x|vac〉y). (3)
Suppose that Alice now switches to the control mode and measures the state of the mode t.
According to equation 3, one can see that after the B-A attack Alice will detect no photon with
the probability 1/4 or with the probability of 3/4 a photon whose state is perfectly anticorrelated
with the state of the home photon. Therefore, the probability of eavesdropping detection based
on the correlation observation equals zero. This point is completely same as that in Ref.[25].
Moreover, from equation 3 one can see that the B − A attack in the present eavesdropping
scheme also induces the eavesdropping losses. However, it is worthy to be mentioned that the
eavesdropping losses level (25%) in the present scheme is only half of that (50%) in Ref.[25]. This
implies that, comparing to the Wo´jcik’s eavesdropping scheme, in the present eavesdropping
scheme, the domain in which Eve can attack all the transmitted bits is enlarged to be [0, 75%]
from the [0, 50%] in Ref.[25]. Nonetheless, this does not certainly mean that, the insecurity
upper bound of transmission efficiency presented by Wo´jcik can be pushed up, for now we still do
not know the variation of the eavesdropping (legitimate) information gain. Let us now analyze
the performance of the scheme in the case of Alice operating in the message mode. After Alice
performs the Zj operation and sends the travel photon back to Bob, Eve performs her second
attack (named as the A−B attack hereafter) on the travel photon. The A−B attack consists of
the unitary operation T−1. After the A−B attack, the corresponding state of the whole system
is
|A−B〉 = T−1Zjt |B −A〉
4=
1√
2
(|0〉h|1〉t|j〉y + |1〉h|0〉t|0〉y)|vac〉x
=
1
2
(|Ψ+〉ht|j〉y + |Ψ−〉ht|j〉y + |Ψ+〉ht|0〉y − |Ψ−〉ht|0〉y)|vac〉x. (4)
The final step of the eavesdropping scheme is a measurement of polarization performed on the
y photon, the result is denoted by k. The result of Bob’s Bell-state measurement on both
photons is denoted by m = 0(1) corresponding to the |Ψ+〉ht(|Ψ−〉ht) state. Let P (k,m|j) be the
conditional probability of possible measurement outputs of |A − B〉 for a given value of j, then
the only nonzero probabilities are,
PI(0, 0|0) = 1, PI(0, 0|1) = PI(0, 1|1) = PI(1, 0|1) = PI(1, 1|1) = 1/4. (5)
Assume that in Alice’s secret messages, the occupation possibilities of the ’0’ and the ’1’ bits
are c0 and 1 − c0 respectively, then one can work out the mutual information between any two
parties,
IAE = IAB = c0 − 1
2
[(1− c0) log2(1− c0) + (1 + c0) log2(1 + c0)], (6)
IBE = −(1 + c0) log2(1 + c0) +
1− c0
4
log2(1− c0) +
1 + 3c0
4
log2(1 + 3c0). (7)
Specifically, when c0 = 1/2, then
IAE = IAB =
3
4
log2
4
3
≈ 0.311
IBE = 1− 3
2
log2 3 +
5
8
log2 5 ≈ 0.074. (8)
Same as Wo´jcik’s eavesdropping scheme, the present scheme is also not symmetric. If after the
A−B attack Eve performs an additional unitary operation S = XtZtNtyXt with the probability
of 1/2, where X is an negation, then the asymmetry can be removed. If the S is performed, the
final state of the whole system is transformed into
|A−B〉(s) = ST−1Zjt |B −A〉
=
1√
2
(|0〉h|1〉t|j〉y − |1〉h|0〉t|1〉y)|vac〉x
=
1
2
(|Ψ+〉ht|j〉y + |Ψ−〉ht|j〉y − |Ψ+〉ht|1〉y + |Ψ−〉ht|1〉y)|vac〉x. (9)
Then the only nonzero P (k,m|j)’s are,
P
(s)
I (0, 0|0) = P (s)I (0, 1|0) = P (s)I (1, 0|0) = P (s)I (1, 1|0) = 1/4, P (s)I (1, 1|1) = 1. (10)
Considering the assumption that in Alice’s secret messages the occupation possibilities of the ’0’
and the ’1’ bits are c0 and 1− c0 respectively, one can work out the mutual information between
any two parties,
I
(s)
AE = I
(s)
AB = 1− c0 −
1
2
[c0 log2 c0 + (2− c0) log2(2− c0)], (11)
I
(s)
BE = −(2− c0) log2(2− c0) +
c0
4
log2 c0 +
4− 3c0
4
log2(4− 3c0). (12)
5Specifically, when c0 = 1/2, then
I
(s)
AE = I
(s)
AB =
3
4
log2
4
3
≈ 0.311
I
(s)
BE = 1−
3
2
log2 3 +
5
8
log2 5 ≈ 0.074. (13)
Incidentally, it is easily found that, when c0 6= 1/2 (Note that c0 = 0 or c0 = 1 is meaningless),
IAE 6= I(s)AE , IAB 6= I(s)AB and IBE 6= I(s)BE . Same as that in Ref.[25], later we only consider the
case of c0 = 1/2.
According to the viewpoint in Ref.[25], that is, since Eve knows exactly when each of the
S operations has been performed, the symmetrization procedure does not reduce the mutual
information between Alice and Eve while it disturbs the communication between Alice and Eve
in such a way the mutual information between Alice and Bob is reduced, in the present scheme
after the S operations the mutual information between Alice and Bob is also reduced to be
IAB =
3
4 log2 3− 1 ≈ 0.189.
By the way, one can easily find that in the present eavesdropping scheme the quantum bit error
rate induced by the eavesdropping is also at the same level of 1/4 as that in Ref.[25].
Thus far, we have improved Wo´jcik’s eavesdropping scheme. One can see that the improved
scheme is almost same as Wo´jcik’s eavesdropping scheme except for the induced eavesdropping
losses. Hence, all the discussions in Ref.[25] except for those related to the eavesdropping losses
are also suitable for the present paper and we will not repeat them. Now let us discuss a very
important property related with the eavesdropping losses. According to our above calculations
of the mutual information, one can see that, when η = 1, comparing to Wo´jcik’s eavesdropping
scheme, the eavesdropping (legitimate) information gain does not decrease (increase) with the
decrease of the eavesdropping losses in the improved scheme. As mentioned before, in the im-
proved scheme the η domain in which Eve can attack all the transmitted bits is enlarged to be
[0, 75%] from the [0, 50%] in Ref.[25]. In the η domain of (50%, 75%], the eavesdropping infor-
mation gain does not decrease in the improved scheme but in Wo´jcik’s eavesdropping scheme.
Thus, in this sense, one can say that the less eavesdropping losses do induce more eavesdropping
information gain. Moreover, in the improved scheme, when η increases from 75%, though the
mutual information between Alice and Eve (Bob) will decrease (increase) for Eve can only attack
a fraction of the whole transmitted bits, the IAE is still able to exceed the IAB up to almost 80%
transmission efficiency (cf. Fig.1).
In summary, we have improvedWo´jcik’s eavesdropping scheme on the Bostro¨m-Felbinger quan-
tum communication protocol. The improved scheme only induces half of the eavesdropping losses
in Wo´jcik’s scheme and accordingly in the η domain of [0, 75%] Eve can attack all the transmitted
bits. When η = 1 the eavesdropping (legitimate) information gain does not accordingly decrease
(increase). Hence, in the η domain of (50%,75%], the less eavesdropping losses do induce more
eavesdropping information gain. Moreover, as for as the Bostro¨m-Felbinger protocol is concerned,
the insecurity upper bound of the transmission efficiency has been pushed up from the 60% in
Wo´jcik’s scheme to 80% in the present scheme.
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FIG. 1: Mutual information between Alice and Eve (Bob) IAE(IAB) as a function of quantum channel
transmission efficiency η. According to the figure 4 in Ref.[25], when η increases form 75%, IAB in this
figure should increase not linearly but more slowly. We simplify it just because we only want to estimate
an approximate upper bound.
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